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ABSTRACT
Theoretical noise trader models suggest that uninformed traders can impact market 
prices.  However, these models’ conclusions depend crucially on the assumed 
specification for noise trader demand.  This research seeks to empirically determine the 
appropriate demand specification for uninformed traders.  Using commercial market 
sentiment indices as proxies for noise trader demand, Granger causality models are 
estimated to examine the linear linkages between sentiment and futures returns.  The 
models strongly suggest that noise traders are positive feedback traders (i.e., extrapolative 
expectations) with relatively long memories.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Black defines Αnoise≅ as noninformation (e.g., chart formations, technical signals, 
and investing fads) and Αnoise trading≅ as trading on noise as if it were information.  The 
impact and motivations of noise traders have long been debated.  Some renowned 
economists (i.e., Friedman) dismiss these traders as fodder for rational arbitrageurs, while 
others (i.e., Keynes) assert their impact on long-term market expectations.  Traditional 
arguments rely on simple logic or casual observation; but, recently a rigorous theoretical 
literature has developed that examines the impact of noise traders on asset price behavior 
(e.g., De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 1989,1990a, 1990b, 1991).  These 
models suggest that noise traders can impact market prices and social welfare; 
furthermore, they can profitably exist within the economy.  However, the theoretical 
specification of noise trader demand is crucial to the models' predictions and subsequent 
empirical tests (Cutler, Poterba, and Summers, 1989).  To date, little work has been done 
on rigorously describing and quantifying noise trader demand (e.g., Solt and Statman; De 
Bondt).  The purpose of this research is to empirically examine the nature of noise trader 
demand in commodity futures markets.
Noise traders take market positions based on nonfundamental information.1  The 
theoretical demand structure of noise traders has been specified in numerous forms.  For 
instance, Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989) specify noise trader demand as a function 
of past prices.  That is, uninformed traders are purely trend-followers with extrapolative 
expectations.  On the other hand,  De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (DSSW, 
1     A particular type of noise trader is a positive feedback trader.  Positive feedback 
traders buy after price increases; whereas, negative feedback traders sell.  A feedback 
trader has a short-memory if demand is a function of very recent market returns.  A 
feedback trader with a long-memory would utilize a longer history of returns in forming 
expectations.  Clearly, long-memory is a relative term.  In this paper, it refers to a trader 
using more than the most recent period=s return in forming expectations.
1990a) specify noise trader demand as a function of a random variable, sentiment.  In this 
particular model, noise trader demand is driven by fads, social trends, and whims that 
stroke market sentiment.  The demand function assumed in these models can alter their 
results.  For instance, in Cutler et al.=s (1989) model positive feedback traders can create 
negative short-run autocorrelation in returns or long-run mean reversion depending on the 
exact demand specification.  Clearly, a realistic demand specification is vital for the 
correct interpretation and empirical testing of noise trader models.  The following research 
seeks to provide empirical insights as to an appropriate characterization of this demand.
Noise traders are often categorized as retail or small speculators.  There has been 
some attempt to characterize the speculative demand or decision-making process of these 
investors; however, this research has focused almost exclusively on equity markets.  For 
instance, Solt and Statman examine the sentiment of retail stock investors as captured in 
the Bearish Sentiment Index compiled by Investor=s Intelligence.  This gauge of market 
sentiment is constructed by surveying market newsletters as to their outlook.   Solt and 
Statman find that this market sentiment index contains no useful information for 
forecasting market returns.  Furthermore, the aggregate  sentiment among newsletters is 
positively correlated with past market returns.  Similarly, De Bondt finds that the 
individual speculators surveyed by the American Association of Individual Investors 
demonstrate trend-following tendencies.  That is, they are most bullish immediately 
following price increases.  Collectively, this work suggests that the retail stock market 
speculator displays extrapolative expectations.
The following research expands previous work by examining a comprehensive set 
of futures markets and explicitly examining the demand structure of noise traders:  Is noise 
trader demand driven by past prices, i.e., extrapolative expectations, or is it a function of 
unobservable social variables?  To confront this issue, the research relies on two measures 
of investor sentiment: Consensus= Index of Bullish Market Opinion and Market Vane=s 
Bullish Consensus Index.  The sentiment indices essentially gauge the degree of 
bullishness (or bearishness) among retail futures speculators.  Assuming that retail 
speculators do not have private fundamental information, then their sentiment and, hence, 
the indices serve as a proxy for noise trader demand.  Using these data along with returns 
from a large cross-section of futures markets, the demand structure of noise traders is 
directly addressed.
II.  MEASURING NOISE TRADER SENTIMENT
Two investment services firms, Consensus Incorporated and the Market Vane 
Corporation, compile sentiment indices for futures markets.  Each uses a slightly different 
methodology, but the general idea is the same.  Market advisory services, newsletters, 
electronic bulletin boards, and hotlines are surveyed as to whether they are bullish or 
bearish on particular commodities.  The number of services that are bullish is then 
expressed as a percent of the total surveyed.  The indices are referred to as bullish 
sentiment.
CONSENSUS= Index of Bullish Market Opinion
The methodology Consensus uses to compile its bullish sentiment index is quite 
simple.  Consensus publishes a weekly market paper, CONSENSUS: National Futures and 
Financial Weekly, that contains a sampling of investment newsletters.  From the sample of 
letters that Consensus receives, it compiles a sentiment index with a simple count of the 
number of bullish newsletters as a proportion all newsletters expressing an opinion. 
Consensus only considers those opinions which have been committed to publication.  The 
Consensus bullish sentiment index at time t (CBSIt) is expressed as:
For instance, if Consensus receives 100 newsletters that comment on the frozen pork 
bellies market and 25 of those think that belly prices are going to increase, then the CBSI 
is 0.25 or 25 percent.2    The CBSI is compiled each Friday, reflecting the opinions 
expressed in newsletters that were published during the week.  It is released early the 
following week by recorded telephone message and published in the following Friday's 
edition of CONSENSUS.
Market Vane's Bullish Consensus Index
The Market Vane Corporation takes a slightly different and more detailed 
approach to calculating a sentiment index.  It receives market recommendations from 
brokerage firms and market advisors via newsletters, hotlines, and electronic transmission. 
Each market opinion (for a commodity) is weighted on a scale (B) from zero to eight with 
2     Consensus, Inc. indicates that some interpretation is required for newsletters that do 
not explicitly make buy or sell recommendations.
tCBSI =
number of bullish newsletters
number of newsletters expressing an opinion
 .
0 and 8 being fully bearish and bullish, respectively.  Next, each market letter is weighted 
according to its perceived influence or following.  For newsletters, hotlines, and electronic 
bulletins this weight (W) is proportional to the subscriber base, and for brokerage firms it 
is proportional to the number of brokers at the firm.3  The Market Vane bullish sentiment 
index (MVBSIt) at time t is:
t
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where, Bj is the degree of bullishness on a scale from 0 to 8 for advisor j, Wj is the 
influence weight assigned to the advisor, and there are a total of N advisors commenting 
on the market.   The index is compiled each Tuesday, reflecting the opinions received 
since the prior Tuesday.  The index is released on the same Tuesday via wire and 
facsimile. 
Noise Traders and Information Sources
As a maintained hypothesis, it is assumed that the indices compiled by Consensus 
and Market Vane reflect the sentiment of noise traders--not rational or informed market 
participants.  That is, the market views subsumed within the indices are those of small 
retail speculators who are acting on noninformation:  technical trading rules, extrapolation, 
or old news that is already incorporated into the market price.  This maintained hypothesis 
is supported by reviewing the decision-making rules of small traders and sampling their 
information sources.
In a 1965 survey of amateur futures speculators, Smidt attempted to classify their 
trading styles and decision-making criteria.  Smidt found that more than one-half of the 
3     Market Vane, Inc., does not go into great detail as to the exact weighting scheme, 
method of calculation, or the determination of weights for particular advisory services.
349 traders surveyed relied exclusively (or moderately) on price charts to render trading 
decisions.  Only four percent of those surveyed considered themselves information 
specialists who obtain and use information before it is widely available to other traders. 
Finally, most amateur speculators surveyed preferred to trade commodities about which 
they had personal knowledge or advice.
Surveys by the Chicago Board of Trade and Barron's suggest that small speculators 
do not behave in an entirely rational manner (see also Brennan; Nagy and Obenberger). 
Draper summarizes the surveys' findings.  The surveys suggest that the average futures 
trader is highly educated, and they trade for the leverage and excitement.  Furthermore, 
their important sources of information include:  articles/publications, broker and 
newsletter recommendations, advisory services, and their own analysis.  Consistent with 
these findings, Canoles' 1990 survey of 115 retail futures traders in Alabama reveals that 
speculators enjoy the drama and suspense of carrying open positions.  Their favorite 
sources of information are professional trading advisory services and general financial 
publications.  Collectively, these results suggest that retail speculators generally do not 
bring new information to bear on the markets, and they garnish much of their information 
from focused media sources such as those surveyed by Consensus, Inc. and the Market 
Vane Corporation.
Market advisors, brokers, and newsletters provide decision-making information for 
retail futures speculators; but, are they providing real information, or simply relaying old 
news and technical comments?  Excerpts from an issue of CONSENSUS provide insight as 
to the information contained within advisors' recommendations and market newsletters.
Many market advisors rely on technical indicators and simply pass along this 
information to their retail subscribers.4  
The (soybean) market is in a sideways pattern between 563 and 547.  If the 547 
support is taken out, then the market could decline to 530....Charts suggest the 
market has confirmed the sideways pattern and thus we feel comfortable selling 
and did so today  (Biedermann, Allendale, Inc.).
The major uptrending channel line is at 102-00 today.  The strong close puts the 
market in a strong position once again.  The old main top at 102-29 was taken out. 
This means that 101-08 is the new main bottom.  Now that the (T-Bond) market 
has closed inside of the uptrending channel the upside potential is 103-17. Long-
term swing chart is still projecting a rally to 103-26 by February 24th (James A. 
Hyerczyk, Hyerczyk Technical Comments).
Each issue of CONSENSUS is filled with this type of technical commentary for nearly 
every futures market.  Although much more rare than technical analysis, some newsletters 
are fundamental in nature, relaying government reports, seasonal tendencies, and pertinent 
cash market conditions.
The USDA left the 1994-95 ending stocks of soybeans unchanged at 510 M.B. 
which suggests that the market will not be as sensitive to weather as corn or 
possibly wheat....Seasonally, the market tends to bottom in late February and work 
higher into March and May  (Strickler, Bradford & Co., Inc.).
Cash cattle prices reached $75.00/cwt. this week as tight market-ready supplies and 
solidarity among feedlot operators forced packers to bid prices 
upward....Extremely current marketings enabled them (feedlots) to drive hard 
bargains with packers and force prices higher.  This bodes well for the cash market 
for the next six to eight weeks  (Vaught, A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.).
Although they often contain detailed interpretations of relevant supply and demand 
factors, the fundamental analysis tends to reiterate public information.  
4     The following quotes are taken from CONSENSUS: National Futures and Financial 
Weekly, Consensus, Inc, Volume XXV, Number 7, February 17, 1995.
The noninformational nature of the market newsletters, coupled with the evidence 
that retail investors rely on this advice in making decisions, supports the maintained 
hypothesis:  the sentiment indices are valid proxies for noise trader demand.  To the extent 
that market opinion is correlated across advisors, noise traders will act in concert (Shleifer 
and Summers).
III.  DATA, METHODOLOGY, and RESULTS
Futures Data and Markets
Weekly futures returns are calculated for the closest to expiration contract where 
the maturity month has not been entered.  Two different time series of futures returns are 
created to match-up with the sentiment data.  First, nearby contract returns are calculated 
Friday-to-Friday using closing prices.  This data series corresponds to that of the weekly 
Consensus sentiment data.  Second, to match the weekly Market Vane sentiment data, 
futures returns are calculated from Tuesday-to-Tuesday using closing prices.  Returns (Rt ) 
are calculated as the log-relative change in closing prices, ln(pt /pt-1).  Weekly data from 
May 1983 to September 1994 are available for analysis (591 observations).
A cross-section of twenty-eight futures markets is examined to strengthen the 
studies= general conclusions and to avoid erroneous implications based on the nuances of 
a particular market.  Markets are chosen based on the availability of the futures and 
sentiment data.  To facilitate the presentation of results and for relevant comparisons, 
related markets are designated into commodity groups.  Group classification is based on 
common production/consumption patterns and expectations concerning the correlation of 
returns and sentiment among the markets.  
The five commodity groups include: grain (corn, wheat, soybeans, soybean meal, and 
soybean oil); livestock (live cattle, feeder cattle, live hogs, and frozen pork bellies); 
food/fiber (coffee, sugar, cocoa, orange juice, cotton, and lumber); financial (Deutsche 
mark, British pound, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, Treasury bills, and 
Treasury bonds); and metal/energy (gold, silver, platinum, heating oil, crude oil, and 
gasoline).  A complete listing of markets and contracts is presented in Table 1.5 
Summary Statistics
The general characteristics of the sentiment indices are explored with simple 
summary statistics presented in Tables 2 and 3.  The mean sentiment level (% bullish) 
tends to be fairly neutral at around 50 for the MVBSI (Table 3); however, the CBSI (Table 
2) have means that are notably less than a neutral 50.  In fact, the mean CBSI is statistically 
less than 50 at the 1% level (two-tailed t-test) for all the markets except LC and SB.  The 
range of the mean CBSI is from a low of 38.5 for HU to a high of 51.6 for LC.  In 
comparison, the MVBSI means are in a rather narrow range from 47.1 for PB to a high of 
55.3 for SB.  Although some of the markets have a mean MVBSI that is statistically 
different than 50, they are in general much closer to and more evenly distributed around 
50 than the CBSI means.6 
For both sets of indices, sentiment is quite volatile with large standard deviations 
and extremes of above 90 and below 10.  Again, the CBSI are notably more volatile and 
extreme (especially at lower levels) than the MVBSI.  The disparities between the Market 
Vane and Consensus data sets are likely due to differences in sampling size and 
procedures.  The extreme values of sentiment along with its volatility suggest that the 
advisors that make-up the indices are reacting to correlated market signals.  As an 
5     In the following discussion and tables, the commodities are referred to by their ticker 
symbols given in Table 1.
6     Of the twenty-eight markets, thirteen mean MVBSI are statistically greater than 50 at 
the 1% level, and one, PB, is statistically less than 50 at the 1% level.
illustration of the sentiment behavior over time, the CBSI for coffee is plotted in Figure 1.  
The sentiment data also display a high level of correlation both across the two 
indices and across markets.  As shown in the final column of Table 3, the simple 
correlations between the CBSI and MVBSI range from 0.596 for FC to 0.799 for GC.  This 
suggests that the two indices capture the sentiment of an alike group of traders that share 
decision-making criteria.7   Similarly, the cross-market correlations are strong within 
commodity groups.  Table 4 presents the simple correlation coefficients among related 
markets.  Note, the correlation of sentiment within commodity groups is relatively strong. 
For instance, the correlation between C and S for the CBSI is 0.631, and it is 0.782 
between JY and DM for the MVBSI.  These type of correlations are indicative of 
systematic noise trader demand that covaries across traders and markets (see DSSW, 
1990a).
Noise Trader Demand and Extrapolative Expectations  
Solt and Statman as well as De Bondt document that retail stock market speculators 
exhibit extrapolative expectations--becoming more bullish after recent market increases. 
They demonstrate this with simple OLS regressions of sentiment on past stock market 
returns.  Here, that methodology is refined, and the specific form of extrapolative 
expectations is tested.  
A general method of exploring the linear linkages between and sentiment and price 
is within the  "Granger causality" framework.8  Hamilton suggests the following direct or 
bivariate Granger test:  
7     The degree of overlap among the sources surveyed by Consensus and Market Vane is 
not known.  Certainly any overlap will create correlation between the two indices; 
however, given their different selection criterion it is unlikely that this accounts for the 
correlation.
8     To avoid the philosophical connotations associated with strict cause-and-effect, the 
terms "lead" and "lag" are used in reference to the stated hypothesis.
where, ∆t and Rt represent noise trader sentiment and futures returns, respectively, and et is 
a white noise error term.
Causality from returns to sentiment in equation (1) is tested under the null of bj=0  
j.  Specifically, equation (1) is estimated with OLS, and the null hypothesis that Rt does not 
lead ∆t (i.e., bj = 0   j) is  tested with a Chi-squared test (Hamilton, p. 305).9, 10   The 
aggregate sign of causality (positive or negative) is  addressed by summing the impact of 
lagged returns, 3 bj, and testing if it equals zero using a two-tailed t-test.  If  3 bj > 0, then 
the noise traders are also positive feedback traders or trend-followers.  That is, their 
demand is an increasing function of past prices.
Choosing the appropriate lag lengths (p,q) is of practical significance in 
performing the causality test (see Thorton and Batten; Jones).  As suggested by Beveridge 
and Oickle, the order of an autoregressive system may best be determined by searching all 
possible lags for the combination that minimizes a model selection criterion.  For example, 
in (1) the model is estimated by varying the own-lag length of ∆t from p=1,2,...pmax, and the 
9     Note, misspecification of equation (1) due to cointegration and an omitted error-correction 
term is not a problem with these data as sentiment is clearly stationary I(0) in levels.
10     The causality test assumes that the two series, ∆t and Rt, are covariance stationary, and et 
is an i.i.d. white noise error.  This assumption is tested using White's general test for 
heteroskedasticity in the error term.  If et is heteroskedastic, then the model is re-estimated using 
White=s heteroskedastic consistent covariance estimator, and the appropriate test for the 
parameter restrictions is a Wald Chi-squared test (Greene, p. 392).  A Lagrange multiplier test is 
used to verify that the residuals are serially uncorrelated.  If, after choosing the optimal lag 
length, the residuals demonstrate autocorrelation, then additional lags of the dependent variable 
are added as explanatory variables (i.e., p is increased in equation 1) until the autocorrelation is 
eliminated.
t 0
i=1
p
i ti
j=1
q
j tj t= c + a + b R + e  ,ρ ρ∑ ∑
lag length of Rt from q=1,2,...,qmax such that a total of (pmax x qmax) regressions are estimated. 
The p,q lag length combination that minimizes Akaike's information criteria (AIC) is chosen 
as the final model specification.  This purely objective procedure has the advantage of not 
placing the artificial restriction that p=q.  Additionally, it eliminates the uncertainty in 
multivariate cases of deciding the order in which to enter additional variables into a model. 
For equation (1), all possible lag-length combinations are estimated with pmax = qmax= 8, and 
p,q is chosen to minimize AIC. 
The estimation results for each market are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for the CBSI 
and MVBSI, respectively.  The results indicate that noise traders are predominately 
positive feedback traders, i.e., returns lead sentiment and the cumulative impact is positive. 
In each market examined, the null hypothesis that returns do not lead sentiment is rejected 
at the 0.01 level.  The additive effect of lagged returns is statistically positive (1% level) 
for every market except PL in the Market Vane data set.  Past returns and sentiment levels 
explain a fairly large portion of the variation in sentiment with the adjusted R-squared 
ranging from 0.53 to 0.78 in the CBSI models and 0.37 to 0.69 in the MVBSI models. 
These results are consistent with prior work on sentiment (Solt and Statman; De Bondt) 
and conjectures that noise traders are often trend-followers.
Close examination of Tables 5 and 6 reveal that the degree of trend-following 
differs somewhat across commodities and the data sets.   For a more general 
characterization of noise trader demand, the causality test in (1) is estimated by pooling the 
time series data across the designated commodity groups.  The pooled cross-sectional time 
series models are estimated using the GLS procedure of Kmenta (pp. 616-635) correcting 
for cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity.  The lag-lengths for the pooled 
regressions are specified by choosing the maximum p and the maximum q from among the 
individual market specifications within each group.  For instance in the CBSI grain group 
the maximum p is 2 (S and BO) and the maximum q is 2 (C, S, SM, BO); therefore, the 
pooled grain model's lag structure is 2,2.  This specification procedure may over-specify 
lag structures at the expense of statistical power, but it assures that the model does not 
suffer from an under-specification bias.
The estimated pooled models are presented in Tables 7 and 8 for the Consensus 
and Market Vane data, respectively.  For each pooled regression, the null hypothesis that 
returns do not lead sentiment (i.e., bj = 0   j) is tested with a Wald Chi-squared test, and the 
cumulative impact of lagged returns is again tested with a two-tailed t-test (i.e., 3 bj = 0). 
Concentrating on the CBSI results in Table 7, certain characteristics of sentiment are 
evident.  First, across groups, sentiment follows a fairly strong positive autoregressive 
process with first-order coefficients around 0.65.  Second, statistically significant positive 
extrapolation is demonstrated at one and two week lags for all the groups, i.e., positive 
feedback traders have relatively long memories.  For instance, in grains, a one percent 
weekly return results in sentiment increasing by 1.26 percent the following week and 0.376 
percent the week after that.  For all the groups, the null that returns do not lead sentiment 
can be rejected at the 1% level, and the cumulative impact of lagged returns is significantly 
positive (1% level).  These results hold for the MVBSI models in Table 8 as well, where 
again the null hypothesis are rejected for each commodity group.
To illustrate the behavior of sentiment when driven by extrapolative expectations, 
the impulse response function for a one standard deviation shock to returns is calculated 
(see Harvey, p. 234).11  Figures 2 and 3 show the impulse response functions for the 
pooled CBSI and MVBSI models, respectively.  Looking at the CBSI results (Figure 2), a 
standard deviation shock in weekly returns causes the greatest initial increase in food/fiber 
market sentiment.12  Notably, the impact on metal/energy and financial market 
11   Implicitly, it is assumed that sentiment is endogenous and impacted by an exogenous 
shock to returns.
12     The standard deviation of weekly returns (in parenthesis) for each group is as 
follows:  grain (0.029), livestock (0.029), food/fiber (0.042), financial (0.013), and 
metal/energy (0.036).
sentiment does not reach a peak until two weeks after the initial shock.  All of the 
response functions decline rather smoothly and at similar rates, except for the livestock group 
where extrapolative effects are less pronounced.13  The impulse response functions for the 
MVBSI (Figure 3) display a greater disparity of demand response among the groups. 
Consistent with the CBSI data, the MVBSI data show that the food/fiber group is most prone to 
trend-following.  The strength of extrapolative expectations in this group may arise from a 
relatively high proportion of uninformed traders or a scarcity of public fundamental 
information.  In total, the pooled models strongly suggest that the noise traders subsumed 
within the sentiment indices are long-memory positive feedback traders.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The presented analysis uses commercial market sentiment indices to explore noise 
trader demand in futures markets.  It is maintained that the market sentiment indices adequately 
measure the demand of retail speculators.  Furthermore, these small speculators rely on 
nonfundamental  information in forming their expectations; thus, they are noise traders.  The 
role of extrapolative expectations in noise trader demand is investigated within a Granger 
causality framework.  The results suggest that noise trader demand (i.e., sentiment) is an 
increasing function of past returns.  Furthermore, noise traders have relatively long memories. 
That is, sentiment is influenced by returns over at least the previous two weeks.  The sentiment 
indices exhibit other characteristics of theoretical noise trader demand.  Sentiment is very 
volatile with many extreme observations, and it covaries across related markets.  These 
characteristics are consistent with systematic noise trader risk that can impact markets (see 
DSSW, 1990a).
13     The impulse response functions decline toward their long-run or total multiplier which is 
zero, as is the case for any stationary series.
Collectively, the findings suggest that the traders composing the indices are long-
memory positive feedback traders.  Clearly, these traders respond to similar pseudo market 
signals (i.e., past returns), and as a result sentiment moves in unison and takes large swings to 
extreme values.  These empirical findings have direct implications for the interpretation and 
testing of theoretical models.  For instance, Cutler et al.=s (1989) model generates returns that 
are positively correlated if noise traders are short-memory negative feedback traders.  The 
evidence presented here would shun that scenario in favor of the results for long-memory 
positive feedback traders.  For this type of noise trader, their model generates short-run positive 
autocorrelation and long-run negative autocorrelation in returns (i.e., mean-reversion). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, these are the anomalous characteristics of asset returns that are 
considered stylized facts (see Cutler, Poterba, and Summers, 1991).
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Table 1.  Markets and Contract Months. 
Market(ticker symbol) Contract Months
Grain
Corn(C)* March, May, July, Sept., Dec.
Wheat(W) March, May, July, Sept., Dec.
Soybeans(S) Jan., March, May, July, Aug., Sept., Nov.
Soybean Meal(SM) Jan., March, May, July, Aug., Sept., Oct., Dec.
Soybean Oil(BO) Jan., March, May, July, Aug., Sept., Oct., Dec., 
Livestock
Live Cattle(LC) Feb., April, June, Aug., Oct., Dec.
Feeder Cattle(FC) Jan., March, April, May, Aug., Sept., Oct., Nov.
Live Hogs(LH) Feb., April, June, July, Aug., Oct., Dec., 
Pork Bellies(PB) Feb., March, May, July, Aug.
Food/Fiber
Coffee(KC) March, May, July, Sept., Dec.
Sugar(SB) March, May, July, Oct.
Cocoa(CC) March, May, July, Sept., Dec.
Orange Juice(JO) March, May, July, Sept., Nov.
Cotton(CT) March, May, July, Oct., Dec.
Lumber(LB) Jan., March, May, July, Sept., Nov.
Financial
Deutsche mark(DM) March, June, Sept., Dec.
British pound(BP) March, June, Sept., Dec.
Swiss franc(SF) March, June, Sept., Dec.
Canadian dollar(CD) March, June, Sept., Dec.
Japanese yen(JY) March, June, Sept., Dec.
Treasury bills(TB) March, June, Sept., Dec.
Treasury bonds(US) March, June, Sept., Dec.
Metal/Energy
Gold(GC) Feb., March, April, June, Aug., Oct., Dec. 
Silver(SI) March, May, July, Sept., Dec.
Platinum(PL) Jan., April, July, Oct.
Heating Oil(HO) Jan.-Dec.
Crude Oil(CL) Jan.-Dec.
Gasoline(HU) Jan.-Dec.
*Ticker symbols are presented in parenthesis and used throughout the remainder of the tables 
when referring to the various markets.
Table 2.  Summary Statistics, Consensus Data:  May 1983 - September 1994.
Market     Mean        St. Dev.   Min.          Max. 
C*          45.701 19.916     5      92
W          46.413       20.193     3     91 
S         46.783       17.882     12     90
SM         42.501       20.012      5       95             
BO         43.992      21.861      5       96             
LC        51.584       15.547     15       87        
FC        46.998       19.617     6       95  
LH         44.332       15.696     13       88 
PB        39.716       17.913     4      88
KC         43.992       20.906     5       96
SB         51.279       22.112      5       94
CC        41.755       20.455      4       94
JO         40.294       22.731      6       94
CT        45.981       21.331      7       96
LB        42.181       21.033     5       94
DM         46.876      21.822     4       89
SF        45.205       21.739     3       94
JY         42.701      20.821     3       91
BP        42.870       22.017     0       96
CD         41.591      19.899     0       92
TB         46.619     20.917      5       93
US         44.406       17.525      9       86
GC         43.570       20.630      3       96
SI         43.531       19.254      4       95
PL        44.450       21.641      6       95
HO        39.679       20.469      4       87
CL        40.401       18.471      3       86
HU         38.551       20.674      5       93
*All of the markets have 591 weekly observations, except CL and HU which begin in April 
1985 and have 494 observations.
 
                                                                                       
Table 3.  Summary Statistics, Market Vane Data:  May 1983 - September 1994. 
** 
Correlation
Market    Mean        St. Dev.    Min.           Max. Coefficient
  
C*         53.286       16.343      12     89         0.763
W         52.797       14.715      16      88          0.703
S        52.673       15.429      16       93         0.740
SM       51.321       15.767      12       89          0.718
BO       52.983       15.838      11       89         0.716
LC        52.975       14.680      16       90          0.750
FC        51.418       17.225       5       95          0.596
LH        49.318       15.065      15       87          0.720
PB        47.146       15.018      15       91          0.653
KC        52.526      17.270      11       93          0.721
SB        55.299      16.758      15       91          0.749
CC        49.550       17.481      11       91          0.725
JO        51.602       19.316      5       93          0.716
CT        50.613       16.071      9       88        0.722
LB        50.355       16.503      5       93          0.632
DM      53.044       15.692      15       96          0.770
SF       52.958       15.508      14       96          0.745
JY        52.526       15.186      14       95          0.712
BP       51.051       16.283      13       95          0.745
CD       50.689       15.628      10       97          0.659
TB       51.585       14.711     11       94          0.612
US        50.555       13.085      13       90          0.676
GC       52.673       13.572      16       85          0.799
SI       52.854       13.382      12       92          0.745
PL       52.029       16.263      10       97          0.726
HO        50.871       16.102      10       90          0.673
CL        48.876       16.737      8       95          0.616
HU        49.645       16.384      9       89          0.636
*The Market Vane summary statistics are calculated with 591 weekly observations.
**The final column is the simple correlation coefficient between the Market Vane and 
Consensus indices.  They are calculated with 591 weekly observations, except for HU and HO 
which have 494 observations.  All the correlations are statistically different from zero at the 1% 
level.
Table 4.  Correlation Matrices, Sentiment Across Markets:  May 1983 - September 1994.  
The upper (lower) off-diagonal entries are correlations for Consensus (Market Vane) data. 
Simple Correlation Coefficients
Panel A: Grain
C* W S SM BO
C 0.472 0.631 0.481 0.549
W 0.525 0.387 0.335 0.352
S 0.716 0.534 0.692 0.693
SM 0.593 0.458 0.714 0.332
BO 0.617 0.449 0.744 0.415
Panel B: Livestock
LC FC LH PB
LC 0.673 0.470 0.268
FC 0.792 0.315 0.180
LH 0.605 0.491 0.654
PB 0.447 0.373 0.764
Panel C: Food/Fiber
KC SB CC JO CT LB
KC 0.005 0.249 0.023 0.102 0.049
SB -0.015 0.062 0.037 0.073 0.069
CC 0.334 0.061 0.006 0.046 -0.017
JO 0.057  0.101 0.153 -0.072 -0.021
CT 0.076 0.144 0.156 0.138 0.217
LB -0.012 0.215 0.004 0.067 0.242
Table 4 (continued).  Correlation Matrices, Sentiment Across Markets:  May 1983 - 
September 1994.
 
Simple Correlation Coefficients
Panel D: Financial
DM SF JY BP CD TB US
DM 0.916 0.613 0.774 0.299 0.168 0.259
SF 0.946 0.605 0.789 0.288 0.135 0.186
JY 0.782 0.800 0.591 0.286 0.181 0.126
BP 0.757 0.771 0.624 0.331 0.134 0.152
CD 0.190 0.196 0.139 0.280 0.046 0.191
TB 0.134 0.152 0.106 0.026 0.052 0.627
US 0.107 0.098 0.081 0.012 0.099 0.778
Panel E: Metal/Energy
GC SI PL HO CL HU
GC 0.700 0.611 0.101 0.087 -0.081
SI 0.813 0.653 0.059 0.032 0.024
PL 0.676 0.693 0.086 0.122 0.068
HO 0.206 0.246 0.215 0.762 0.634
CL 0.287 0.310 0.302 0.877 0.751
HU 0.146 0.227 0.183 0.784 0.805  
*The correlations are calculated over 591 observations, except for those using the 
Consensus  CL and HU data which begin April 5, 1985 and have 494 observations.  The 
standard error of the estimated correlations is (1/n-3)2, so with n=591 the standard error is 
0.04123 and any correlation coefficient greater than 0.0809 (0.106) is statistically different 
from zero at the 5% (1%) level using a two-tailed t-test.  

Table 5.  Granger Causality Test, Returns Lead Sentiment, Consensus Data.  
The model is estimated with OLS, and the Wald Chi-squared statistic tests the null, H0: bj=0  j. 
The cumulative impact of returns is calculated, 3 bj  j=1,2,..,q., and tested against the null, H0: 3 
bj=0, with a t-test.
Market p,q Π2(q) p-value3 bj t-stat. p-value adj. R2
C* 1,2 39.56 0.000 152.6 4.94 0.000 0.761
W 1,1 63.83 0.000 140.7 7.98 0.000 0.741
S 2,2 23.70 0.000 135.3 4.17 0.000 0.701
SM 1,2 42.64 0.000 172.9 5.45 0.000 0.658
BO 2,2 45.70 0.000 178.5 6.29 0.000 0.653
LC 1,6 73.92 0.000 424.3 5.67 0.000 0.608
FC 4,1 43.17 0.000 266.1 6.57 0.000 0.531
LH 2.2 89.65 0.000 183.8 3.96 0.000 0.675
PB 2,3 54.17 0.000   79.3 3.96 0.000 0.630
KC 3,3 92.76 0.000 211.7 7.65 0.000 0.652
SB 3,2 60.91 0.000   90.2 6.75 0.000 0.782
CC 2,2 81.92 0.000 175.2 7.64 0.000 0.631
JO 5,2 37.82 0.000 175.6 5.71 0.000 0.693
CT 5,2 68.17 0.000 215.8 6.75 0.000 0.715
LB 1,2 63.92 0.000 155.6 6.52 0.000 0.608
DM 2,2 97.44 0.000 379.8 7.23 0.000 0.759
SF 2,3 100.5 0.000 460.7 7.42 0.000 0.769
JY 1,5 73.15 0.000 685.8 6.47 0.000 0.745
BP 4,3 81.07 0.000 466.3 6.52 0.000 0.759
CD 3,2 59.12 0.000 917.5 6.84 0.000 0.688
TB 4,1 66.43 0.000 2194 8.15 0.000 0.679
US 4,2 106.3 0.000 388.3 8.22 0.000 0.727
GC 2,2 71.74 0.000 282.5 7.59 0.000 0.795
SI 4,6 98.77 0.000 201.8 4.71 0.000 0.709
PL 2,2 73.41 0.000 213.4 7.91 0.000 0.703
HO 1,1 51.06 0.000   89.4 7.14 0.000 0.645
CL 4,1 40.55 0.000   65.5 6.36 0.000 0.683
HU 4,2 30.15 0.000 119.2 5.03 0.000 0.587
*All models are estimated over 536 weekly observations, except for those involving CL and HU 
which are estimated over 438 observations.
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Table 6.  Granger Causality Test, Returns Lead Sentiment, Market Vane Data.
The model is estimated with OLS, and the Wald Chi-squared statistic tests the null, H0: bj=0  j. 
The cumulative impact of returns is calculated, 3 bj  j=1,2,..,q., and tested against the null, H0: 3 
bj=0, with a t-test.
Market p,q Π2(q) p-value3 bj t-stat. p-value adj. R2
C* 3,2 22.16 0.000 123.7 4.16 0.000 0.576
W 3,2 52.52 0.000 201.2 6.92 0.000 0.513
S 1,6 39.74 0.000 186.4 3.80 0.000 0.549
SM 2,2 54.78 0.000 145.9 5.82 0.000 0.572
BO 3,3 65.84 0.000 171.9 6.03 0.000 0.591
LC 6,1 54.99 0.000 192.5 7.41 0.000 0.551
FC 6,2 33.29 0.000 305.8 4.90 0.000 0.376
LH 1,2 46.71 0.000 150.9 5.56 0.000 0.549
PB 1,2 39.41 0.000   88.5 5.18 0.000 0.463
KC 5,2 54.91 0.000 145.2 7.17 0.000 0.577
SB 2,3 54.18 0.000   54.7 3.18 0.002 0.598
CC 5,1 47.18 0.000 102.1 6.86 0.000 0.529
JO 2,2 64.21 0.000 172.2 7.44 0.000 0.629
CT 2,1 32.91 0.000   94.8 5.73 0.000 0.644
LB 2,3 63.56 0.000 178.1 6.37 0.000 0.575
DM 1,1 54.60 0.000 181.4 7.38 0.000 0.699
SF 1,1 46.50 0.000 166.3 6.81 0.000 0.645
JY 1,3 33.25 0.000 311.5 4.86 0.000 0.635
BP 2,1 41.83 0.000 164.3 6.46 0.000 0.693
CD 2,1 41.10 0.000 501.5 6.41 0.000 0.597
TB 6,2 28.37 0.000  1651 4.82 0.000 0.610
US 5,4 37.60 0.000 243.3 3.42 0.001 0.601
GC 1,1 17.84 0.000 71.85 4.22 0.000 0.637
SI 4,5 33.19 0.000   94.1 3.01 0.002 0.538
PL 4,6 44.33 0.000 74.17 1.58 0.115 0.618
HO 1,4 25.38 0.000 140.8 4.63 0.000 0.533
CL 5,1 20.87 0.000   54.6 4.56 0.000 0.591
HU 1,4 38.33 0.000 169.5 5.63 0.000 0.466
*All models are estimated over 558 weekly observations, except for those involving CL and HU 
which are estimated over  539 and 457 observations, respectively.
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Table 7.  Pooled Causality Test, Returns Lead Sentiment, Consensus Data.  
Independent
Variables Grain Livestock Food/Fiber Financial Metal/Energy
intercept 11.09 12.03 10.45 10.33 10.02
(16.9)* (12.3) (17.0) (16.6) (13.7)
∆t-1 0.664 0.617 0.645 0.692 0.685
(31.2) (26.1) (33.2) (39.2) (32.7)
∆t-2 0.091 0.049 0.028 0.021 0.026
(4.57) (1.78) (1.21) (0.96) (1.02)
∆t-3 0.022 0.044 -0.003 0.029
(0.80) (1.94) (-0.15) (1.15)
∆t-4 0.053 0.011 0.052 0.022
(2.32) (0.49) (3.11) (1.07)
∆t-5 0.026
(1.54)
Rt-1 126.5 95.9 104.0 233.8 94.1
(14.6) (11.6) (18.8) (17.5) (13.8)
Rt-2 37.6 25.9 32.9 79.6 29.5
(4.44) (3.03) (5.64) (5.67) (4.15)
Rt-3 4.09 5.22 28.4 4.64
(0.47) (0.90) (2.01) (0.65)
Rt-4 -5.76 28.5 -1.95
(-0.78) (2.11) (-0.28)
Rt-5 -7.65 -5.93 9.54
(-0.94) (-0.44) (1.38)
Rt-6 -4.67 -3.37
(-0.58) (-0.50)
3 bj 164.1 107.8 142.2 364.6 132.4
(12.8) (4.86) (13.2) (10.7) (7.24)
Π2(q) 221.6** 143.9 368.7 364.6 202.7
Buse R2 0.667 0.545 0.683 0.671 0.653
*T-statistics in parenthesis test if the coefficient equals zero, with degrees of freedom equal to 
N*K-(p+q+1), where N=536 (438 for metal/energy) and K=number of markets in the group.
**All the Π2(q) statistics reject that the coefficients on lagged returns are zero at the 1% level.
Table 8.  Pooled Causality Test, Returns Lead Sentiment, Market Vane Data. 
Independent
Variables Grains Livestock Food/Fiber Financial Metal/Energy
intercept 20.58 19.80 15.77 13.84 14.62
(17.9)* (15.3) (18.7) (17.5) (13.7)
∆t-1 0.518 0.511 0.552 0.622 0.567
(25.1) (22.1) (27.6) (36.1) (27.5)
∆t-2 0.024 0.018 0.090 0.046 0.032
(1.05) (0.73) (3.96) (2.28) (1.36)
∆t-3 0.063 0.017 0.044 0.063 0.054
(3.09) (0.69) (1.99) (3.16) (2.32)
∆t-4 0.044 -0.025 -0.033 0.061
(1.81) (-1.19) (-1.68) (2.60)
∆t-5 -0.016 0.034 0.023 0.006
(-0.68) (2.05) (1.21) (0.30)
∆t-6 0.037 0.009
(1.81) (0.57)
Rt-1 116.5 76.5 83.9 133.3 55.8
(15.5) (9.95) (16.1) (12.6) (9.52)
Rt-2 44.5 33.2 24.6 33.8 32.2
(5.65) (4.24) (4.49) (3.14) (5.36)
Rt-3 15.74 1.91 -3.19 4.93
(2.04) (0.35) (-0.29) (0.82)
Rt-4 0.67 1.01 4.10
(0.08) (0.09) (0.68)
Rt-5 -3.85 -11.4
(-0.52) (-1.94)
Rt-6 3.35 -6.34
(0.47) (-1.09)
3 bj 177.1 109.8 110.5 165.0 79.3
(8.35) (9.74) (10.7) (7.27) (4.98)
Π2(p) 258.8** 112.9 264.1 164.8 111.3
Buse R2 0.501 0.389 0.581 0.556 0.518
*T-statistics in parenthesis test if the coefficient equals zero, with degrees of freedom equal to 
N*K-(p+q+1), where N=558 (457 for metal/energy) and K=number of markets in the group.
**All the Π2(q) statistics reject that the coefficients on lagged returns are zero at the 1% level.

